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LEARNING FROM OTHER




Should economists pay much attention to the
economies of small far-away countries, or should we
focus largely on the big fish in the global economy –
the US,the EU,Germany within the EU,Japan – and
the coming big fish of China and India? Aside from
Ruritanians, why should an economist care about
what happens in little old Ruritania?
I first began to ponder this question with respect to
Australia when I was asked to contribute to the
“Bobfest” retirement party in honor of Australia’s
leading economist, Robert Gregory. Australia was a
fine place to see Kangaroos and Coral Reefs or to
party … but why should anyone besides an
Australian or a Kangaroo care about this the farthest
reaches of the world? Major American and Euro-
pean economics journals rarely publish articles
about Australia or other far-away countries, suggest-
ing that we have not much to learn from them.
Characteristics of models studied by biologists –
and economists
Biologists see small far-away creatures differently.
Biologists specialize in model organisms – slugs,bac-
teria, flies, yeast, squid, zebra fish, mustard plants,
mice, etc.They spend years studying these creatures
not because of any weird fetish for creepy crawlies
but because the species provides exceptional insight
into fundamental biological issues. Mendel’s peas,
for example, opened the door to the genetics of
inheritance that no other organism could have done.
By analogy,could the same held true for Australia or
other small economies? Are there general lessons
about economic behaviour that we can learn from
far-off economies in which we have no intrinsic
interest? Should we think of potential model
economies in the way that biologists think of slugs,
bacteria, mustard plants — as models that could
teach us broad lessons?
To guide my thinking, I examined what determines
whether a species becomes a model organism, stud-
ied by hundreds or thousands of biologists, or lives a
life of quiet obscurity?
One factor is the tractability of researching the
species, which depends on accessibility and the ease
and cost of experimenting with extant laboratory
technology. The parallel in economics is the avail-
ability of reliable data on economic behaviour. In
modern research this means micro files on individu-
als and firms, longitudinal matched employer-
employee files; time budget studies; matched files
linking health and biological markers to outcomes;
measures of workplace practices and productivity;
and so on.The French and Scandinavians have been
good in developing matched longitudinal employee-
employer data files. The Scandinavians have good
data relating biological measures, such as birth
weight, to outcomes. The UK has the Workplace
Employment Relation Surveys on labour practices
at workplaces.
What about the Australians? Australia also has
excellent statistics. Its labour market data include
cross-section surveys , longitudinal surveys, a unique
longitudinal survey of immigrants, workplace sur-
veys, time use surveys, regular Censuses, input-out-
put tables, the Household Income and Labour
Dynamics in Australia.1 But, unlike most major US
data sets such as the Census of Population, Current
Populations Survey, PSID, these data files are not
readily downloadable on the Web, which makes
them more difficult to access.
A model species in biology invariably has some dis-
tinct feature that allows researchers to make
progress in a significant line of inquiry. The equiva-
lent for a model economy would be variation in some
economic factor that allows us to draw inferences
about economic behaviour in general.The variation
could be a policy change – a new tariff law, imposi-
tion of new labour laws,development of an indepen-
dent central bank, rapid expansion of the supply of
schooling; etc. Or it could be some global shock – a
sudden rise in natural resource prices, collapse of a
trading partner,the advent of China and India to the
* This article is based on the author’s “Learning from Other
Economies: The Unique Institutional and Policy Experiments
Down Under”, Economic Record, 2006, Vol. 82, Issue 257, pp.
195–206.Richard B.Freeman,Harvard University and NBER,free-
man@nber.org. 1 For details on these surveys see the references in Freeman (2006).global economy, the development of IT– that
induces economic response from workers, firms, and
even the government.
Third, a model species must be sufficiently linked to
other creatures, particularly to humans, to allow the
scientist to generalize the findings.2 Generalizing in
biology rests on the similarity of cellular processes
across living creatures due to universal scientific
laws and evolutionary heritage.3We share 96 percent
of our DNA sequence with chimpanzees and are
closely related to worms,flies,dingos and kangaroos,
for that matter. Medical scientists work with mice
because mice have immune systems similar to ours,
so that finding ways to treat diseases in mice could
generalize to humans. Still, there are sufficient dif-
ferences among organisms that doctors invariably do
human trials to see if it works on humans.
Using the biology analogy, the responses of individ-
uals to incentives would seem similar to cellular
processes, which should be comparable across
economies. By contrast, interactions of people in
organizations or markets or entire economies would
be closer to the behavior of whole organisms. This
suggests that phenomenon where independent
responses by people are critical– say demand
responses to price incentives – would generalize bet-
ter across economies than phenomenon involving
interactions among organized groups. It further sug-
gests that there is more learned from economies that
share broad similarities in institutions and history
than among economies with very different modes of
operating and traditions. As an advanced economy
with a legal system and culture derived from Britain,
Australian experiences should be relevant to
economies with similar backgrounds,such as the US,
UK, Canada, Ireland, and New Zealand (Freeman,
Boxall, Haynes 2007), and potentially to other
advanced OECD countries as well.
The fourth factor that contributes to a species
becoming a model is a cumulated body of knowledge
about it that helps experimenters design and inter-
pret experiments.The social science equivalent is the
strength of a country’s research community. Re-
searchers with knowledge about how things work in
an economy can be critical in assessing data and
behavior,particularly relating to broad-ranging insti-
tutions and practices, which outsiders may misinter-
pret.Australia has a strong research community that
is sufficiently confident and forthright to let tran-
sient economists know when they get matters wrong.
Australia as a model economy
In sum,an economy that combines good information
with natural experimental variation in practices/poli-
cies relating to economic behaviour broadly is a
viable candidate for model economy in the areas in
which it offers distinct experiences. Since Australia
has good data, a strong research community and
close links to other Anglo-American economies, the
critical question,it is a good candidate model econo-
my. The key issue is where Australia has made
unique innovations in policy/practice or had distinc-
tive economic experiences whose findings could gen-
eralize to economics broadly. As a labour specialist,
I latched onto three: the country’s changing mode of
labour relations; use of market mechanisms to deliv-
er public services in higher education and employ-
ment services; and reliance on immigration and nat-
ural resources as sources of growth.
Labour relations
“Australia needs a workplace system geared to the
future, not to the past” (Australian Prime Minister
John Howard 2005).
When I first learned that Australia used an awards
system to determine wages,I reacted as early settlers
to Oz must have reacted on seeing the platypus or
emu – utter disbelief. Markets are supposed to set
wages, not judges on industrial tribunal court pro-
ceedings. Judges aside, the Australian systems of
awards resemble European mandatory extension
systems of determining pay, by guaranteeing that
collective bargaining covers workers outside the
organized sector as well as those in it.This contrasts
with countries like the UK or US where collective
bargaining covers only those in the bargaining unit.
By extending institutionally determined wages to
most workers, the awards systems lower the disper-
sion of wage. From one perspective, it does what the
Invisible Hand seemingly fails to do in the job mar-
ket:establish a single price for a given type of labour.
From another perspective, it risks reducing incen-
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2 A model organism “must not only be convenient to work on, but
it also has to be related to other things that are useful” (John
Sulston,www.welcome.ac.uk/en/genome/genesandbody/hg05f003.
html, p. 2).
3 Nature did not “completely reinvent the wheel and come up with
a new set of molecular rules for each phylum”. (Thomas Carew,
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tives and depressing the employment of low wage
workers.The Australian awards system helped make
the country’s equal pay legislation more successful
than similar legislation in the US (Gregory 1999).
In the 1990s–2000s,led by the trade unions,Australia
shifted to more enterprise level bargaining. The
Labour Party’s 1993 Industrial Relations Re-
form Act strengthened enterprise bargaining. The
Howard government’s 1996 Workplace Relations
Act encouraged individual arrangements, ended
union shop agreements, and limited the authority of
Industrial Relations Commission to make awards.
Many firms and workers preferred the status quo of
collective contracts and awards to the alternative of
individual contracts.The Table shows that 61 percent
of employees had their pay institutionally deter-
mined as of 2004.
In November 2005 the government enacted legisla-
tion to privilege individual contracts over collec-
tive contracts and weaken labour market protec-
tions for workers further. The new legislation
allowed firms to require that employees sign an
individual contract and give up the right to be cov-
ered by a collective agreement as a condition of
employment. Enterprise agreements could not
override individual contracts. The “no disadvan-
tage test” that required that contracts give workers
pay and conditions at least as good as the relevant
award was weakened. The law excused firms with
less than 100 employees from unfair dismissal laws;
narrowed the Industrial Relations Commission’s
role in labour relations; and established a new
commission to set minimum awards over a smaller
domain of issues.Finally,the new law made it more
difficult for unions to strike while allowing man-
agement freedom to lockout workers. To impose
the law throughout the country, the federal gov-
ernment claimed the right to override state labour
laws which the Australian Supreme Court declared
constitutional in 2006.
The government’s “Work Choice”program is the most
radical anti-union policies enacted by an advanced
democracy.The changes go beyond anything conserva-
tive governments in the UK or US ever proposed, or
that New Zealand enacted in the 1990s.A comparable
change in corporate law would be to privilege private
equity over publicly owned corporations by removing
the limited liability protection given to shareholders.
The changes are also remarkable in that government
has proposed them in a period when the Australian
labour market and economy are functioning well, with
low unemployment and accelerated productivity
growth.Australia is not in Great Britain’s 1980s Winter
of Discontent nor the US air traffic controllers 1981
illegal strike against the Federal Government.
Given the weakened state of Australian unions, the
new legislation could be the death knell to collective
labour arrangements. Or it could produce sufficient
backlash from unions and workers to overturn the
government at the next election. Public reaction to
reports of unfair practices by employers under the
new rules has been so negative that in 2007 the gov-
ernment withdrew the Work Choices brand name
under which it publicized the new law.
Whatever happens what is critical for this essay is
that the new legislation provides a “natural experi-
ment” that makes Australia the model economy for
assessing collectivism in the labour market. What
more could a social scientist ask for than an extreme
change in law with no apparent motivation beyond
the government’s ideological vision of “the work-
place of the future”? 
Market mechanisms for public services
In 1989 Australia developed the world’s first income
contingent mode of funding much of higher educa-
tion – the Higher Education Contribution Scheme
(HECS; Chapman 2001). The HECS differentiates
tuition by field, gives students the option for paying
fees up-front or through deductions from future
earnings;offers a more equitable way of funding stu-
dent education than taxing citizens; is less risky for
students than loans; and gives greater autonomy to
universities to determine the student contribution
amount within the specified ranges.
Shifting the cost of higher education from the state
to students has helped Australia increase university
enrollments while reducing state funding of higher
education relative to GDP. In addition, it induced
Percentage of workers with wages set by different
mechanisms, 2004 
Mode of wage-setting Percentage covered
Awards 20 
Collective bargaining 41 
Individual 34
Proprietors 5
 Source: Australian Bureauof Statistics (May 2004,
 cat no 6306.0).Australian universities to raise revenues by selling
undergraduate education to the citizens of other
countries. It has not discouraged low income
Australian students from going to universities or
reduced the overall rate of university attendance. If
detailed data on the system were readily available on
a web site, analysts in other countries would down-
load the information and perform the types of stud-
ies that would fit their country’s concerns, and thus
spread this innovation.
Australia has also marketized government-funded
employment services. In most countries, the state
aids job seekers through state agencies.Until recent-
ly, some European countries restricted private
employment agencies so that the state monopolized
employment services. In 1998 Australia chose a dif-
ferent route.It privatized or outsourced employment
services to non-profit and profit-seeking agencies, as
well as to competing public agencies – ‘a radical
transformation of employment service delivery ...
without parallel in OECD countries’ (OECD 2001,
15).By opening the market for employment services
to competitive bids, Australia sought to unleash the
forces of competition on what had been an adminis-
trative function of the government.The result was a
large drop in the cost of employment services, with
no apparent loss in quality, which won laudits from
the OECD. Independent researchers have, however,
been more skeptical, withholding judgment until
data from providers of services are open to public
scrutiny (Webster and Harding 2001). Australia’s
outsourcing of public employment offers a unique
opportunity to examine the success of different gov-
ernment,private and community agencies in deliver-
ing a traditional government service.
Growing Oz: Immigration and natural resources 
As a “settler economy” Australia has grown through
immigration and the application of modern technolo-
gy to natural resources and to agriculture. Since not
all settler economies have been economic successes –
Argentina is often viewed as Australia’s errant twin
economy in this respect – and since natural resources
have proven to be a curse to many economies –
Australia’s success as an immigrant-receiving and nat-
ural resource dependent economy merits attention.
On the immigration side, in 2000 approximately one
fourth of the Australian population were immigrants
– twice the proportion in the US, making Australia a
model economy for understanding the impact of
immigration on macro-economic outcomes and eco-
nomic growth. Immigrants appear to have had little
adverse effects on the wages or employment of
natives (Addison and Worswick 2002) while con-
tributing to growth.An immigration policy based on
points for skills arguably contributed to this effect.
Until the early 1970s, Australia subsidized passage
for Europeans from some countries.Since then it has
used the point system to encourage immigration of
skilled workers (Miller 1999). It gives points to per-
sons who attend Australian universities, which pre-
sumably both attract students to Australian universi-
ties and encourages their immigration.
On the natural resources side, Australia has devel-
oped despite being highly dependent on
minerals/fuels and agriculture for the bulk of its
exports. The country fell from near the top of the
GDP per capita league tables – 5th in the OECD in
1950 to a much lower position – 15th in 1990, but
rebounded in the 1990s to reach 7th spot in 2005, in
part due to the boom in natural resources. In the
1990’s the mineral share of exports rose to 40 per-
cent of Australia’s exports. But the country sur-
mounted the “Dutch Disease” (known as “Gregory
curse” in Australia) problem in which a booming
resource sector boosts the real exchange rate and
erodes the competitive position of manufacturing. If
China keeps demanding natural resources as it
grows rapidly, more countries will find that natural
resources are critical to economic growth, and
should look to the Australian experience here.
Make your economy a model economy
The argument that economics has much to learn
from behaviour in model economies just as biology
learns from model species directs attention at the
experience of economies regardless of location or
size.The requirements for a model economy are ade-
quate data;interesting variation in policies/practices;
sufficient similarity to other economies to allow find-
ings to be generalized; and a knowledgeable set of
home grown economists.
Australia’s policies and practices and accessible data
make it a model for illuminating labour relations,
market provision of public services, and develop-
ment via immigration and natural resource. If the
country’s political leaders create additional extreme
policy experiments, there will be a lot for the rest of
us to learn from Australian experience.
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Finally,while I have made Australia my prime model
of a model economy, you do not need Kangaroos to
serve as a model economy. Data, variation in poli-
cies/practices, some similarity with other economies,
and a base of knowledge. Fellow economists, if you
determine the areas where your economy is a good
model and follow the lesson from biology to study
those areas, perhaps we can accelerate our rate of
progress as biology has done.
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